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hformed Consent and Medical
Experimentation

GEORGE H. MARTIN, JR.

Certain biomedical technologies already or almost already with us "threaten
to reduce the meaning of man and to degrade the human spirit in the very process of
becoming technologically feasible, long before the final stage of deployment and
widespread use has been reached."' It is this threat that has prompted me to
consider certain medical and legal problems associated broadly with the human
experimentation process. I shall be examining the concept of "informed consent" to
both experimental medical therapy and nontherapeutic scientific experimentation
as a means of protecting man from the potential ravages of a zealous application
of scientific advances in the biomedical sphere. The problems surrounding human
experimentation seem to be an especially fruitful area for research, for they starkly
present the tensions between two fundamental values of Western civilization:
the protection of individual inviolability and the freedom of scientific inquiry.2
Where values conflict and competing policies vie for public attention, acceptance,
and funding, then the law is often called upon to mediate the ensuing conflicts.
We shall examine the role that law can effectively play in the human experimentation
process.
In this time of rapidly accelerating technological development and innovation,
one often hears cries that "Technology is out of control!" The posed solution is
generally that we must "retrench," that man himself must take an active and firm
role in rationally planning the future development of technology by considering
both social and individual benefits and costs, alternative modes of development, etc.
This may be a correct approach, as far as it goes. The focus on man as decisionmaker is correct. However, the problem only begins and does not end here. We must
ask who the decision-maker is, can be, and should be in human experimentation
situations, determine his capacity for decision-making, and analyze the availability
of alternative safeguards should informed consent prove to be a faulty one.
In the context of human experimentation, we find that the concept of "informed
consent" has been accepted as the sine qua non for research with human beings.
Hence, courts, commentators, and scientists have seen protection for man from
undesirable biomedical technologies as emanating from requirements of the definition
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of informed consent and well-considered applications of that doctrine in specific
circumstances.
I suggest in this paper that the effort to protect human subjects through the
doctrine of informed consent is a seriously misplaced, and therefore dangerous, one,
for by deluding ourselves into thinking that consent can be an adequate safeguard
for men, we fail to look for other, much more significant mechanisms to protect both
the human and scientific values that Western civilization professes to value so highly.
Consequently, my effort here will be threefold: to examine the functions, weaknesses
and limitations, and alternatives to the doctrine of informed consent as it is applied
as a protective device for subjects in the human experimentation process. I shall
also consider the current state of the law on informed consent and suggest that
subject/patient protection in the biomedical context can perhaps best be effected by
a comprehensive look at the whole process of experimentation and not simply focus
on the administrative stage as informed consent does.
THE EXPERIMENTATION PROCESS

Therapy and Experimentation
Over two hundred years ago a court of law held that a physician experiments
at his peril, that if he deviates in any way from the commonly accepted method
of medical treatment for his patient, he is liable for the consequences that ensue. 3
Not surprisingly, this view has altered somewhat over the course of the past two
centuries. While traditionally medical "treatment" and "experimentation" have been
seen as two separate entities, the more sophisticated medical view today is that all
therapy-at least all serious therapy-is experimentation, but that all experimentation
on human subjects does not necessarily carry any therapeutic benefit to the patient
or subject. This distinction is worth keeping in mind. As Paul Freund has stated:
The deepened knowledge of complex biological processes, the range of
options in treatment, and the idiosyncrasies of patients' reactions, all make
it inevitable that sound medical practice be experimental in a sense that
does not contradict the nineteenth-century admonition, but renders it
much less meaningful and serviceable as a guide to professional conduct.4
There is as well an interrelation between therapy and systematic scientific
investigation that has also aided medical science in becoming more experimental
today. This relationship is founded on two very basic characteristics that underlie the
origin of and growth of science and technology: "the need to control the workings
of nature for our welfare and the simple, irreducible need to understand the world
about us and ourselves."' It is thus argued (and with some force) that the need
to acquire knowledge for the benefit of both individuals and society as a whole requires
experimental interventions into the lives of patients/subjects. If the premise be
granted, we must as well note countervailing motivations with equally deep roots
in the nature of man and his society: that man fears the unknown and desires to
perpetuate the status quo, that he places supreme value on the sanctity and
dignity of the individual person, and that he deeply desires to control those decisions
affecting his life, rather than leave them solely to the "experts." 6 As we shall see,
it is this tension between the delegation of authority to experts and the concept
of self-determination that frames the problems with informed consent that I will
be discussing herein. Thus, given the internal logic and momentum of science
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and technology, the quest of the scientific community to discover and to apply, and
the impact of the basic concept of "progress" prevalent in the West since at least
the time of the Enlightenment, it is appropriate at this stage to raise a fundamental
question concerning the capacity of man to assert control over science and technology
in general and human experimentation in particular and the extent to which the
process can rationally be controlled.
As lawyers we have a particular concern with and perspective from which we
view the whole problem of medical experimentation with human subjects.7
We tend to look to the fiduciary relationships involved, with the focus on the
obligation of full disclosure and explanation by the investigator and the limitations
of consent by the patient/subject. In fact, the traditional function of consent in
the medical context was to differentiate between those interventions that were
legally permissible and those that would subject a physician to liability for
unauthorized experimentation on his patients.8 Yet we also recognize that we
simply cannot look at consent as the definitive answer to questions of experimentation,
for it is well established by both cases and commentaries that there are some
instances in which a person will not be allowed to consent to certain procedures or
actions, whether for his own or society's benefit. Consent will at times be overridden
to prevent experimentation of a particularly disagreeable sort. There are, in addition,
circumstances in which a person's lack of consent will be ignored as society strives
to protect, again, either that particular individual from the consequences of hs
own actions or its own considered interests from the effects of his failure to consent
to urgently needed medical care or to particularly important experimentation.
These latter observations merely reflect the underlying question as to when a society,
either actively or by acquiescence, may expose some of its members to harm in
order to seek benefits for them or for society as a whole.9
Society and the Individual
Then again, it is also true, as a general principle, that society approves of a vast
array of activities to which competent individuals may consent that have great
social value but also entail varying degrees of probable harm to the individual:
driving an automobile, coal-mining, sky-diving, etc. Calabresi expresses the
rationale thus:
[W}le have become accustomed to the fact that many activities are
permitted, even though statistically we know they will cost lives, since
it costs too much to engage in these activities more safely or to abstain
from them altogether. We have grade crossings, even though we know that
with grade crossings a certain number of people will be killed each year
and even though grade crossings could be eliminated relatively easily.
We use automobiles-knowing that they cost us fifty thousand lives each
year-because to use safer, slower means of transport would be far too
costly in terms of pleasure and profits foregone. Worse even than that,
we use automobiles with relatively safe (but relatively dangerous) control
systems, and so on ad infinitum. And we do this because we deem the
lives taken to be cheaper than the costs of avoiding the accidents in
which they are taken.' 0
Calabresi's tort analysis does inject the whole question of accident compensation
and insurance into the medical experimentation context, and certainly the law can
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and perhaps should respond with some thought to the application of his ideas
to medical experimentation, but of course not without examining the implications of
them for the safety of subjects involved and quality of experiments undertaken.
For this in truth is our fundamental concern.
Calabresi argues for a system in which the actual choice over the taking of lives
(should it come to that

.

. .) is as diffuse as possible:

Thus, the question remains as to whether or not we can find a control
system in the medical experiment field that affords an adequate balancing
of present against future lives and is still sufficiently indirect and selfenforcing as to avoid clear and purposive choices to kill individuals
for the collective good."
The indication is that a serious look at randomness as a moral principle may be
in order."
Random selection would be a very significant procedural protection that could
conceivably reinforce any substantive safeguards we can find in the informed
consent doctrine. There are very real limitations of informed consent and the legal
focus may now best be shifted from a reliance on consent to other forms of
control in order to protect medical subjects. Note that I am not saying that the
consent doctrine is useless or irrelevant in the experimentation process. The thrust
of my paper is that in the medical experimentation context, the biggest problem
we have with "consent" is that we have allowed it to seduce us into believing that we
have been protecting people and we have not really developed other safeguards.
If "consent" is then considered to be a "sham," one comes to the stark realization
that there may in fact be precious little protection for human subjects at all.
And that situation is a proper concern of society as a whole, not just the lawyers.
Law and Values
It might be asked here whether questions as to the sort of control system in
medical experimentation ultimately to find societal acceptance reflect the sort
of problems that traditional legal analysis has always confronted, or whether medical
experimentation is different in kind from other activities that lead to legal problems?
I would argue the former, although I would qualify it to the extent of acknowledging
that medical experimentation involves a series of incredibly complex value questions
that do not alter the nature of the basic legal problem but do make it harder to
grapple with than most legal problems." If we accept the view of Hans Jonas that
the ultima ratio of communal life is and has always been the compulsory,
vicarious sacrifice of individual lives," that ". . . something sacrificial is involved in

the selective abrogation of personal inviolability and the ritualized exposure to
gratuitous risk of health and life, justified by a presumed greater, social good,""
then it would seem that medical experimentation is not really different in kind
from other legal problems.
Rather, like other legal problems, it involves a measuring and balancing of
trade-offs, a weighing of risks, costs, and benefits that will best conform to
the desires and expectations of the society within which the particular legal system
operates. This is why I find Paul Freund's observation so relevant in the
experimentation context: "The law is dialectic in a deeper sense than its adversary
process. It mediates most significanfly between right and right."' 5 For what we
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are concerned with in experimentation is a balancing, a mediating between the
legitimate rights of the various participants in the process, all of whom have unique,
conflicting motivations, capacities, and value preferences-among them, the protection
of man, the advancement of science, and the improvement of the well-being of
society and of future generations.
Thus, only until we examine medical experimentation within the larger societal
context can we begin to formulate the proper rules and procedures that will minimize
harm and yet not erect great barriers to the acquisition of knowledge." And
before this can be done we must perhaps first reject the notion that there is one
natural ordering of ethics, that any one set of ethical norms is entitled to supremacy
above all others, e.g., "respect for human life." This involves an "affirmation that
the merits of the individual case determine the ascendancy of particular ethics
for that particular case. If the assumption is granted that science is a part of the
social system, an institution with values and norms not inherently superior to others,
then ethical conflicts are inevitable."" This then should clear the way for examining
each case of medical experimentation on its merits, rather than futilely trying to
plug a case instantly into one particular ethical box. By deciding each case
on its merits, it will be evident, as Vaughan indicates, that a particular ethic then
will be made ascendant. But it is not argued here that there is any one particular,
universal ethic that should control in all decision-making situations."
CONSENT

IN

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Codes
Generally speaking, those involved in human research and medical
experimentation are quite unlike the theoretical scientists who are, by and large,
free to pursue their own research studies. In fact, the inquiries of the theoreticians
are normally accepted, if not demanded by contemporary society. One major
difference between the two groups of investigators appears to be that human
researchers often find their scientific "freedoms" circumscribed by the rights and
interests of their patients/subjects. In order for researchers to take proper account
of these other rights and interests, it becomes important to define the nature and
extent of their authority." The first question then to be faced is whether it is
safe to leave total authority to the experimenter, trusting to the standards of his
professional conscience. The experience of Nazi Germany suggests that it is not.
For it should be clear that whenever subjects are too helpless or ignorant to
resist participation in experiments, the investigator is in a position to pursue his
scientific interests limited only by his own conscience and professional values.20
It is to this particular problem that the various professional and ethical codes and
standards adopted over the past thirty years particularly have been addressed.
The concept of informed consent for medical investigations was most strongly
set forth in the famous Nuremberg Code of 1947 which was adopted by the
U.S. Military Tribunal there as a standard for judging twenty-five German scientists
accused of atrocities.2 ' While that particular code was drafted for the purpose of
trying Nazi war criminals and did not necessarily answer all experimental questions,
it has had a very great impact on the development of subsequent ethical codes
adopted by international and national professional medical groups.2 2
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Perhaps second only to the Nuremberg Articles in worldwide influence is the
Declaration of Helsinki (1964) of the World Medical Association. 23 It establishes
a fairly complete ethical code for medical experimenters conducting clinical research.
It also makes an important distinction between a purely scientific experiment
and an experiment for therapeutic purposes, carried out on a doctor's own patient(s)
whose illness is not responding to conventional medical treatments. Significantly,
higher standards for obtaining consent are set for the nontherapeutic experiments."'
Perhaps the Helsinki Code's greatest failing is that it focuses entirely on the
needs of the individual subject and virtually ignores the interests of society-a
charge that may fairly be leveled at most codifications and declarations. The only
reference to "society" is the opening sentence: "It is the mission of the doctor
to safeguard the health of the people." The Code is therefore internally contradictory,
setting up a double ethical charge for the investigator but giving him little guidance
as to how to solve the inevitable conflict between the individual patient and the
needs of society. The resolution of the moral dilemma simply does not yield
to an application of a code." Its existence may even be counterproductive if it
serves to mask or obscure fundamental problems behind a facade of very general
principles that may prevent rather than stimulate frank and open discussion of those
basic ethical problems.
It has been suggested that in addition to informed consent, a "more reliable
safeguard for an ethical approach to experimentation is provided by the presence of
an intelligent, informed, conscientious, compassionate, responsible investigator.""
Yet it is not clear that medical science can or does produce such investigators."
One should note that with the traditional physician's view of responsibility for his
patient's well-being it was easy to view the doctor as the sole decision-maker
in the medical context. But once the physical benefits are viewed in relation to the
patient's total situation, then Katz suggests that the patient himself may have to be
given a greater role in the decision-making process." This leads us directly to
an analysis of the informed consent doctrine itself. If we grant that it is important
for decision-makers other than the investigator to participate in the process, then
it is imperative that we consider the subject's role. To determine this we need
to examine the extent and limits of his ability to make decisions in his own behalf."
Consent as a Protective Device
With the concept of consent, we seem to be emphasizing that the primary
regulation of the experimenter-subject relationship is to be between two of the three
parties to the treatment/experiment. Consent has traditionally been thought to be
a protection for subjects from physical violation of their bodily integrity and a
formal recognition of the dignity of man, as an individual, as an end in himself.
As a protective device, however, it is possible that consent may only protect a
patient's freedom of choice (i.e., the "right to consent") and not much of anything
else. Though consent looks at the experimentation process from the subject's
perspective, the doctrinal content of consent may force us to examine the experimenter
as well. For example, if the consent is to be "informed," then we focus on (1) what
the subject knew or (2) what the experimenter told the subject. The second focus
is more directly on the actions of the experimenter than on those of the subject.
If we view consent as a protective device for the subject from his point of view,
then the next logical question is: Did the experimenter go too far? Did he go
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beyond the consent given so as to be liable for malpractice (whether under a battery
or negligence theory) ?30 The same question could as easily be asked in a different
way: How much did the subject consent to? Such questions inevitably lead to
other inquiries into how the consent was obtained and whether there should be limits
on what subjects can consent to.
These inquiries are important, for in speaking of consent we deal with a concept
that is at the heart of Western civilization's idea of individual freedom. Such freedom
is both protected and fostered through the law. It has been suggested that
"[The requirement of consent is the primary means for implementing the abstract
notion of self-determination."" But the sense in which consent actually promotes
freedom is more in the sense of permitting one to give up one's freedom than
in protecting it. Little concern has been given to the former, and much to the
latter in the medical experimentation context. While we emphasize tort law's
protections against interventions to which one has not consented, we fail to observe
that consent to certain actions that may lead to harm will prevent a recovery one
otherwise would have had: volenti non fit injuria (to one who is willing, no wrong
is done). Generally, where no public interest is contravened, courts have left the
individual to work out his own destiny, and have not been concerned with protecting
him from his own folly in permitting others to do him harm. In the negligence field,
this policy is implemented through the doctrine of "assumption of risk" which
relieves a defendant of an obligation to exercise due care (as an "affirmative
defense") and prevents a plaintiff from recovering damages for resulting harm.
Assumption of risk is utilized to say (1) that the risk that plaintiff assumed was
unreasonable (i.e., he was "contributorily negligent") or (2) that defendant was not
negligent at all because he owed plaintiff no duty (negates the existence of a tort).
We see that in either case, plaintiff's consent is employed to show that defendant
owed plaintiff nothing, that, in effect, plaintiff's "freedom" in this context is
the "freedom to lose."
Similarly, contracts involve consensual relationships entered into by two or
more parties, with consent again being the underlying guarantor of an indiv'dual's
freedom. Here each party bargains to receive something in return for his own
promise. If there is a breach of the contract and one party does not receive the
bargained-for performance, the courts will step in with a variety of remedies
to protect that party's bargain, to preserve the "freedom" that he has obtained for
himself via the consensual relationship. Again, this is the sense in which consent
fosters individual freedom. Yet there is another side of the coin, one that is not
nearly so often considered. This situation develops when a court finds a contract to
be unconscionable (or illegal, against public policy, etc.), as when one of the parties
does not get what he "should" from the bargain. In such a case that party's consent
to the bargaln will be set aside for the purpose of making him whole. There is a
suggestion that it is the working of the "free market" that courts wish to support
in their examination of such contracts.3 3 Where this is absent in a contract,
the courts will set it aside. Thus, even in contracts we find that it is not necessarily
consent that is operating to promote individual freedom, but the operation of the
free market. It is clear that such a free market does not exist for medical
experimentation with humans. And its general existence in today's mixed economy
is even a matter of some debate.
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Thus the freedom of consent that we have been examining seems to be a
strange form of freedom indeed, for it often appears to be the freedom to give up
one's freedom." We can buttress this with a reference to the workings of criminal
law. In the area of search and seizure, the primary protection of an individual's
freedom has little to do with consent at all: the requirement of a properly authorized
warrant. In fact, consent to a search and seizure actually is tantamount to a
waiver of legal protection, not a guarantee of it. Also, if a defendant's act is a
crime, affecting the public interest, then the law will often refuse to accept the
consent of the injured party as a defense." We still make murder a crime, even when
the victim is willing." In addition, there are criminal statutes, such as those fixing
the age of consent to sexual intercourse, which are clearly intended to implement
a well-defined public policy-that of protecting a particular class of persons against
their own lack of judgment, and thus against their own consent."
To varying degrees the preceding examples serve to focus our attention on the
fact that there are some circumstances in which consent alone simply will not
adequately safeguard the rights of an individual. Recognizing this fact, the state
has frequently stepped in as a third party to override consent or to require it where
the individual wishes it waived." The court opinions are generally some form of
rationalization (or rejection!) of government paternalism based on the needs
of society to protect itself from a person's actions and also to protect that person
himself from the consequences of his behavior."
Consent in the Experimentation Context
These conflicting interests are equally reflected in the medical experimentation
context, where doubts about the capacity of men to give informed consent at all
starkly present themselves. While the concept of informed consent has always been
accepted as the basic principle for judging the propriety of research with human
beings, the law "has neither defined sufficiently well the substance and ambit of
informed consent in therapeutic settings nor determined clearly its functional
relevance for human experimentation." 40 In a word, informed consent "lacks specific
construction and remains an ill-defined concept." 4 1
In spite of this fact, the basic functions of informed consent have generally
been considered as: (1) serving society's desire to respect each individual's autonomy
and his right to make choices concerning his own life;4 (2) providing the subject
with information and encouraging him to participate in the process so as to increase
its rationality; (3) protecting the experimental process itself by forcing the
investigator to scrutinize his protective measures carefully, by reducing civil and
criminal liability for non-negligent injury to subjects, and by reducing adverse
public reaction to the experiment; and (4) increasing society's general awareness
about human research." Paul Freund has written:
It bears repeating that consent will not protect a badiy designed or
negligently conducted experiment . . . it serves to force the experimenter
to think through and articulate his project in terms of design, risks, and
objectives, and thus it has a valuable reflexive effect on the enterprise
itself, like the practice of a judge in writing an opinion rendering judgment
(sometimes it "won't write"). 44
It would be my view, then, that consent alone is not enough to warrant an
experimental procedure. As Freund indicates above, a bad experimental design
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cannot be immunized simply by procuring subjects' consent. We have to look
elsewhere to protect the subject adequately. By requiring consent, though, we may
promote a better experimental design, which in turn will help to protect subjects
and will increase the public's acceptance of experimentation. Thus, requiring consent
is really more for the immediate benefit of the experimenter himself and society at
large than for the protection of the subject.4 5
We observe that if consent were to be sufficient to allow an experiment to go
ahead, it would clearly have to be both informed and truly voluntary to protect the
subject, since there would be no other safeguards for him. On the other hand,
if consent were to be merely relevant data in the decision whether to allow
an experiment to proceed, i.e., only one factor among many to be considered, and
a person decided to go along with it voluntarily, then perhaps there would be no
need to insist that the consent be fully informed (since the other "considerations" or
factors would be seen to protect the subject from harm: e.g., initial hospital review
committee screening on the quality of the experimental design, including the
protections for the subjects) as well as voluntary. And if we do require consent for
an experiment, we then must ask whether it must be both voluntary and informed.
We may wish to require something here, but are both of these elements strictly
necessary? We can only answer this question by defining the content of consent
in terms of the reasons for requiring it. If the reasons are of the public relations or
improving-experimental-design sort, there would appear to be no necessity for
insisting on these twin requirements. If the reason is more one of acknowledging the
freedom of a person to dispose of his own body, then perhaps the double requirements
of informed and voluntary consent must be satisfied. We note in passing that the
more additional requirements there are to be met before an experiment with a
human subject can go on, the less necessary it is to build in strict consent
requirements. 46
As I have noted, it appears that the strongest case for requiring informed and
voluntary consent is where it is sufficient to allow an experiment to go ahead.
An important question is whether voluntariness and the need for information are
affected by the fact that an experiment is therapeutic rather than solely experimental.
The traditional position appears to be that there should be a higher duty to inform
and secure a voluntary consent with a nontherapeutic subject." The physician/
experimenter will not be allowed to withhold information from a subject that would
normally qualify as an exception to the disclosure requirement in the doctor-patient
context, because the policy permitting risks to be hidden from a patient when
it is important for him not to worry can have no application in the field of research.
Yet there is impressive commentary the other way. For example, Professor
Alexander Capron argues with some force that there is a higher need for information
and voluntariness in the therapeutic situation because of the psychological posture
of the patient grasping for a cure and because of the sheer power that a treating
doctor possesses over a patient.4 8 He recognizes that although there is some
truth to the observation that all treatment is experimentation, there is still a great
difference in the psychological contexts of a therapeutic and a nontherapeutic
procedure. Thus, he would demand a higher standard for therapy, particularly when
an element of honest experimentation is joined with the therapy.4 9
Contrary to either of the previous two positions, one could say that it is
irrelevant whether the procedure is primarily therapeutic or experimental. In order
37

to safeguard the subject's interests, then, we might wish to determine whether
there is an immediate benefit to be gained from the experiment (whether to the
subject, society, etc.), and perhaps set a higher standard where such a benefit is
lacking. This discussion should serve notice that there is some serious disagreement
as to the proper scope for the role of consent in the varying experimental contexts.
It may be helpful at this point to examine how the courts have treated the
concept of informed consent. We should continue to bear in mind the many hats
that consent is wearing: basic protection of subjects, promoting individual autonomy,
enhancing rational decision-making, safeguarding the experimental process itself
(for example, by removal of civil and criminal liability), and increasing society's
awareness of medical experimentation.
THE CASE LAW

Background
In Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital Justice Cardozo stated the
base from which the concept of informed consent has developed: "Every human
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with
his own body . . . except in cases of emergency where the patient is unconscious
and where it is necessary to operate before consent can be obtained. . . ."o
The case revealed the possibility of legal action against a physician for assault
and battery where a person has not consented to the operation performed." Such a
"touching" has been viewed as an intentional interference with the person-a
battery. 52 A physician's misrepresentation of the nature of the operation or the
risk of undesirable consequences has been found to invalidate a patient's consent,
leading to battery." Also, where the physician knew the inevitable consequences
that follow an operation and yet failed to disclose them, he has been held liable."
Even if the particular operation is beneficial or harmless, patients can still recover
nominal or very limited damages." Furthermore, no testimony as to the standard
medical practice in the community is required in battery, for liability is not
based on a standard of care but rather on an unlawful touching.
Negligence has developed as an alternative theory of recovery for patients,
for in many circumstances in which a patient consented to a particular treatment and
an undisclosed risk materialized, courts have been reluctant to find an intentional
tort.5 Rather, courts have more recently tended to hold that if a doctor in the
course of treatment fails to utilize the degree of skill and care that would be
exercised by reputable practitioners in the community under similar circumstances,
and injury follows, then he will be held liable for damages for failure to adhere
to the prescribed standard of care." And this standard applies both to the
performance of the operation itself and to the sufficiency of disclosure of risks
and alternatives.5 8
Whether a jurisdiction employs the battery or the negligence theory, it is clear
the patient must be informed of the risks of the treatment and must give his
consent to it.5 9 Risks that are common knowledge need not be disclosed6 0 ; disclosure
of "material" risks is sufficient.6 ' And physicians will be held responsible for
revealing only those material risks that are known to other comparable medical
practitioners in the community.6 2 Yet there is substantial disagreement among
jurisdictions as to what actually constitutes a "material" risk.
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Most American jurisdictions adopt a community standard to determine the scope
of disclosure for medical risks-those which are consistent with the practice of the
local medical community."' What would make it difficult for plaintiffs to recover
for injuries suffered according to this standard is the fact that expert medical
testimony is required to establish a breach of local medical standards." The
often-mentioned "conspiracy of silence" within the medical profession may pose
very large problems for patients/subjects trying to establish a physician's failure to
live up to the local standards." Furthermore, such a rule clearly is based on the
perceived primary duty of the physician "to do what is best" for his patient,
the secondary duty being the one of disclosure. 6 Thus, "the patient's right to select
treatment is severely limited when it is based only on information deemed worthy
of disclosure according to a medical community standard set by those under the
obligation to inform."" Such a rule, then, runs the risk of completely devouring one
of the fundamental interests that informed consent is supposed to protect-that
of self-determination and individual autonomy. Thus, courts think they are
protecting the individual's best interests when they pour meaning into a doctrine
whose purpose they do not seem fully to understand." I call attention to this
problem, and suggest that recognition of it may go far in altering the legal
formulations given to informed consent. Hopefully, such developments will bring
the law more into line with the reality of the experimental process and the true
functions that consent is able to serve.
Recent Formulations
Fortunately, there are some recent cases that do abolish the medical community
standard and that turn to new tests for measuring the physician's obligations of
disclosure." While the tests essentially adopt a "reasonable man" standard,
the problem is that they apply it to different elements of the case, and there is
need for more consistency here. We shall briefly consider the three cases that
present these problems with the reasonable man standard: Canterbury v. Spence,
Cobbs v. Grant, and Wilkinson v. Vesey.
In Canterbury v. Spence, plaintiff Canterbury had brought an action against
defendant's physician Spence and Washington Hospital Center for personal injuries
allegedly sustained as a result of Spence's negligence in operating, his negligence
in failing to disclose a risk of serious disability inherent in the operation, and
negligent postoperative care by the Hospital. At the close of plaintiff's case, the trial
judge directed verdicts for both the surgeon and the hospital. On appeal, the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the evidence presented
a jury issue as to the surgeon's disclosure and his negligent conduct of the operation.
As to the question of the materiality of information to be disclosed, the court
adopted a reasonable man standard: "The scope of the standard is not subjective
as to either physician or the patient; it remains objective with due regard for
the patient's informational needs and with suitable leeway for the physicians
situation."7 0 i.e., the physician may have leeway to withhold certain collateral risks,
either in emergency situations or where "risk-disclosure poses such a threat of
detriment to the patient as to become unfeasible or contraindicated from a medical
point of view." 7 '
Regarding the issue of causality, the court noted that a causal connection exists
when, and only when, disclosure of significant risks incidental to treatment would
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have resulted in a decision against the treatment. The objective standard adopted to
determine this is what a prudent person in the patient's position would have decided
if suitably informed of all perils bearing significance.' While granting that the
patient's testimony on this score would be relevant but not controlling, the court
rejects the subjective causality standard, since the question whether the
patient actually would have turned down the treatment if he had known the risks
is purely hypothetical. "Viewed from the point at which he had to decide would
the patient have decided differently had he known something he did not know?"' 3
Such a test would place the physician in jeopardy of the patient's hindsight
and bitterness or disillusionment with his treatment and its results. The court thus
rejects a technique that would tie the factual conclusion on causation simply to
an assessment of patient's credibility on the question of whether or not he would
have foregone the treatment.
Cobbs v. Grant adopts a slightly different approach. The case involved a suit by
Cobbs for negligent treatment of a duodenal ulcer that entailed surgery and the
development of serious complications inherent in the surgery that had not
been disclosed to plaintiff beforehand. Verdict was for Cobbs, and the surgeon
appealed. The Supreme Court of California reversed, finding (1) that there
was insufficient evidence to support the verdict on the theory of the surgeon's
negligence during the operation, and (2) that, in view of the instructions to the jury,
it was impossible to tell from the record whether the jury found the surgeon liable
for his decision to operate, for negligently performing the operation, or for failing to
obtain an informed consent. The court was quite clear in adopting an objective
standard for the issue of causality, as did the court in Canterbury." While the court
here did reject the community standard rule as to disclosure as "overbroad"
and "nebulous," it is unclear what standard was adopted for the question of
materiality. It appears that the court focused most of its attention on causality,
leaving materiality undefined but also implying a subjective test for it: "The scope
of the physician's communications to the patient . . . must be measured by the

patient's need, and that need is whatever information is material to the decision."' 5
Wilkinson v. Vesey differs from the preceding two cases in that it adopts an
objective materiality standard (as in Canterbury) but a subjective causality one.
The case involved a malpractice action against radiologists by a patient who
had suffered severe radiation burns. Plaintiff alleged three grounds for her action:
(1) incorrect diagnosis of her ailment; (2) improper administration of the X-ray
therapy; and (3) failure of defendants to obtain her informed consent. The trial
court directed a verdict for defendants, and plaintiffs appealed; the Supreme Court
of Rhode Island sustained the appeal. As to materiality, this court also rejected
the community standard: ". . . the patient's right to make up his mind should not be

delegated to a local medical group."" The jury was found to be able to decide
if the doctor had disclosed enough information to enable the patient to make
an intelligent choice. "Materiality may be said to be the significance a reasonable
person, in what the physician knows or should know is his patient's position,
would attach to the disclosed risk or risks in deciding whether or not to submit
to surgery or treatment.""
The Rhode Island Court also analyzed the causality issue, and concluded that
plaintiff would have to prove that if she had been informed of the material risk,
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then she would not have consented to the procedure and that she had been injured as
Thus, the focus is shifted from what a
a result of submitting to the procedure.
"reasonable man" would have done to what the particular patient would have
done-a subjective causality test.
It has been argued that not only is the subjective standard the appropriate one
to adopt in determining the causation issue, but also that it should be expanded
from simply allowing a plaintiff to recover where he can prove he definitely would
have refused the treatment or procedure to permitting recovery for consequential
damages resulting from the concealment." The basic argument is that such a
position is consistent with a requirement of causation for tort liability, "while
increasing the scope of protection consistently with the reasons for informed
consent."8 0 The crucial point to he made here is that the argument cited above is
only half correct while it masquerades as a full, complete answer to a complex
problem. To permit a subjective standard to control on the issue of causation is to
protect only some of the underlying policies for informed consent: the recognition
and preservation of personal autonomy and the promotion of individual selfdetermination-in short, the choice or "freedom" to consent or to reject a proposed
treatment or experimental procedure. We delude ourselves by believing that the
subjective causality standard is the comprehensive "answer" to furthering all of
the policies that consent serves. It does little to protect the experimental process
itself, to ensure an adequate experimental design before consent is sought when
such ex post facto attacks, based on a questionable hindsight, are permitted. It
complicates the civil and criminal liability calculus for doctors rather than
simplifying it. It does little to promote the scientific values of acquiring knowledge
for the benefit of society as a whole, and may in fact discourage physicians/
investigators from proceeding with innovative therapies and some clinical research,
particularly when all possible risks are not and cannot be known beforehand
(or else it would not even be a medical experiment at all). In short, such a standard
takes a very restrictive view of utilitarianism by elevating one particular ethic to
supremacy on the causation question, contrary to the Vaughan admonitions we
discussed earlier."' I am not saying that it is an "incorrect" approach; I am saying
that its true merits can only be discerned by examining the policies that it actually
serves and not the policies that someone says it serves.
In fact, it may be eminently reasonable to argue that the values promoted by the
subjective causality standard are in fact those that we wish to see placed foremost
in deciding the propriety of medical experimentations. One can argue that since
informed consent is a two-pronged concept (disclosure by the doctor and voluntary
consent by the subject/patient), holding the investigator to a reasonable man
standard on materiality adequately protects his and society's interests in disclosure.
While valuing his expertise and providing for a limited exception to reasonable
disclosure (emergency cases, therapeutic privilege-see n. 71), we still require that
a doctor or investigator act not only as a professional, but as a reasonable man
as well. The consent prong would seem to be adequately protected by the subjective
causality standard if the primary policy is to foster individual decision-making.
If this is only one of a number of competing policies to be served by consent,
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perhaps an objective standard would serve better.
Perhaps the most important point to be made in this regard is that there are
competing policies served by consent. Neither the objective nor subjective causality
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standard can possibly serve them all equally well and a frank recognition of that
fact would lead to an analysis and general debate of the policies that society wishes
to promote in particular therapeutic or clinical contexts. Such recognition would
also lead to a functional, comprehensive definition of consent that would adequately
serve the most important values for each type of medical experimentation procedure.
At the present time, little such awareness, analysis, debate, and formulation of
functional definitions seems to be taking place at a level of generalized public
discourse. It would be worthwhile to look into ways in which such discussion can
be generated.
COMPREHENSION AND INFORMED CONSENT

The Problem of Comprehension

Thus far, we have focused on "information" and "consent" as two separate
activities, serving different needs, and with different requirements for effecting their
underlying policies. The dichotomy is a bit misleading and too simplistic, and there
is another element that merits our consideration: understanding, or comprehension.
It can be argued that a person must be able to comprehend the information which
has been conveyed to him before he can give a truly voluntary consent." While
the concepts of "information" and "consent" remain unsettled to a large degree, we
have yet to see judicial commentary on and development of "comprehension." 4
I stress its importance, if only because failures of comprehension may completely
undercut the objectives of information and consent that the courts are so willing
to assume effectively further the underlying policies. This, too, is an area of needed
inquiry, for it goes right to the substantive question of whether consent can actually
serve the interests of individual freedom, autonomy, and dignity that are generally
assumed to be effectively protected by a stiff consent requirement. Such an
inquiry directly calls into question the validity of the whole enterprise that seeks
to protect subjects through a continued fleshing-out of the consent doctrine.
If we really desire to protect the rights and integrity of subjects in the
experimentation process, then the informed consent doctrine must of necessity
take account of the limitations on a subject's ability to make intelligent decisions.
It is not sufficient to obtain a consent that is "informed" and adheres to the
proper legal procedures but is not an understanding one. Comprehension by subjects
simply cannot be assumed. Thus, we have to look at the "impediments to
self-determination and informed consent inherent in the intellectual capacities,
psychological forces, and social pressures operating in and on man."" And even
more specifically, it would seem necessary for us to inquire whether an awareness of
these problems on the part of both investigators and subjects can overcome the
failures of communication, understanding, and intelligent decision-making now
plaguing the research process. Further, this is an inquiry that might usefully
distinguish between therapeutic procedures and nontherapeutic medical
experimentation, for it would seem that the closer one comes to a purely therapeutic
context the greater are the barriers to full comprehension by the subject.8 6 We
should also emphasize here, again, that if informed consent is not needed just to
protect autonomy but for other purposes (e.g., self-scrutiny by the investigator,
improve the experimental design, etc.) then it may not be necessary to have both an
informed and a voluntary consent, and the questions as to comprehension would
then not be nearly as important or relevant to the experimentation process.
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But if protection of freedom, autonomy, and dignity is our goal, then an understanding
of comprehension is crucial to the analysis.
A Symbolic Commitment
I might add a brief note here. If in fact it was determined that, realistically,
a truly informed consent with maximum comprehension could never be achieved, then
we still might require informed consent to medical experimentation. The reason
would be to maintain a societal, symbolic commitment to the values of freedom and
autonomy in human experimentation. It would be a recognition that there is
an irreducible "something" that constitutes man, that separates him from other
living creatures that is not to be violated or transcended, for fear of obliterating that
very essence of man that makes life worth living: his own dignity as a man.
Thus, taking utilitarianism in its broadest of possible meanings, one can argue that
this symbolic but very real commitment in medical experimentation to what are
perceived as fundamental societal values, though of perhaps no utility in the human
experimentation process itself, finds its utility in the protections it affords
other aspects of life.
It is also true, however, that there may be losses resulting from the symbolic
gains and commitments to which I have just referred, particularly if the exclusive
gain is in fact a symbolic one. One rather serious effect is that if informed consent
only serves as a symbolic commitment to our values of freedom, autonomy, and
dignity, and if we believe that it is the central protective device for subjects in
medical experimentation, then this may lead to complacency in our efforts to discover
other more effective means for protecting subjects and for actually promoting the
important values of freedom, autonomy, and dignity. Unfortunately, this is the
situation that has largely developed with regard to medical experimentation today.
Limitations to Comprehension
If we are aware of the weaknesses of the informed consent doctrine, then perhaps
knowledge of these limitations can help us find ways of dealing with the limitations.
Among these limitations is the very basic controversy over the degree to which
man actually possesses free will." Whether he does or does not-and whether it
is ever really possible to find out-the doctrine of informed consent assumes
the existence of a free will and that a subject will in fact use the information provided
to him in order to decide whether or not to consent to a medical procedure.
Experience with renal transplants suggests that informed consent simply may
be a myth:
all donors and potential donors interviewed by us reported a decisionmaking process that was immediate and "irrational" and could not meet
the requirements adopted by the American Medical Association to be
accepted as an "informed consent."8 8
If we were to assume that people actually used the information that they were
given, then we would like to know how likely it would be for subjects to have the
necessary information. I noted earlier some of the problems related to materiality of
information and the current disclosure requirements for physicians and medical
investigators.8 9 It is of course impossible to give all information anyway, so we wish
to maximize the impact of that actually transmitted. Consent can be sought and
given orally, in writing, or both. To maximize understanding, both should probably
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be required, unless of course the patient or subject is uncomprehending. 0 For
example, recent DHEW guidelines applicable to all research grants and contracts
involving the use of human subjects require only a written consent, but do make
clear that some oral explanation will usually be in order." The written consent
at least is more common in human research, for it is thought to provide subjects with
better information and researchers with better legal protection.
A Procedural Innovation

One of the more interesting recommendations for obtaining informed consent
has been proposed by Robert Miller and Henry Willner. They propose the use
of a two-part consent form, which includes a questionnaire to check how well subjects
understand the information given in the written form itself." The proposal is
aimed primarily at eliminating barriers to comprehension caused by failures of
communication and understanding, whether through basic language problems, cultural
differences between the investigator and the subject, mis-speaking and mishearing, etc."
The first part of the form includes the written consent required by DHEW in
45 C.F.R. 46 and three additional elements: (1) an instruction that the person
is free to refuse to participate; (2) an explanation that such a refusal will not
prejudice either future treatment or future relations with the institution; and
(3) an explanation of why the person was selected and what the purpose of the
experiment is." The second part would be the questionnaire, providing questions
as to the benefits of the experiment, departures from ordinary medical practice,
inconveniences, risks, purposes, and the subject's rights."
If it is determined that the subject's answers to the questionnaire reveal a
"proper" understanding of the procedure, then he could be asked to participate.
If he consents, he can be given a copy of the consent form to keep. This does
two things: (1) It permits him to subject his involvement in the experiment to
continuing informed review, either by rereading the form, or by discussing it
with fellow patients or subjects; and (2) it will help the subject detect differences
between his actual experience in the experiment and what he expected. Discrepancies
can be brought to the investigator's attention."
Should the subject's answers be deemed unacceptable, there are several alternatives: (1) have the subject reread the description of the experiment and answer the
questionnaire a second time; (2) provide an oral explanation of the procedure
and then give the subject another questionnaire; and (3) after repeated failures,
disqualify the subject if the experiment is nontherapeutic or obtain the consent of the
person's legal guardian or representative if the procedure is a therapeutic one.
It should be evident that if a subject continually fails to give satisfactory answers as
to the experiment, then either or both of two problems may be present: (1) the
explanation of the experiment is poor (faulty experimental design); (2) the subject
is not competent to make the informed consent decision for himself.97
While there are still some bugs in such a proposal, the basic idea strikes me
as sound. We may never get to a point where subjects possess perfect understanding
of experiments, but perhaps we can do some concrete things to minimize problems
of understanding and confusion. To the extent that this objective can be achieved,
the preceding proposal is worthy of serious further consideration. But whether
it can ever actually go to the root problem of subjects actually protecting themselves
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via informed consent is another matter. Certainly such a procedure gives the
experimenter good feedback as to the clarity of his experimental design (though
not necessarily its quality) and does evidence a human concern to involve the subject
more personally in the experimentation process, sufficient reasons for warranting
the extra time, money, and effort to implement it.
PROBLEMS WITH SUBJECT GROUPS

Experimentation with Uncomprehending Subjects
Up to this point we have been evaluating how well people seem to utilize the
information they receive in deciding whether or not to consent to an experiment.
There seem to be many obstacles to effective use of the available data. A further
complicating factor is that differences between certain identifiable subject groups may
dramatically affect the capacity of the people within those groups to give an
informed consent. At a minimum, we can identify true volunteers, those requested
by an investigator to participate, patients in therapeutic and patients in
nontherapeutic situations, prisoners,' children, 99 old people and the dying,'Oo
and mental incompetents. 1 0 ' Although a detailed analysis of the special problems
faced by each one of these groups in giving informed consent is obviously beyond the
scope of this paper, I would like to examine briefly the "uncomprehending subjects"
category, which includes both children and mental incompetents, to illustrate some
of the acute dilemmas that such subjects present for medical experimentation.
As a general proposition, we may state the obvious: The further away from
true volunteers we move, the more we increase the problems of effective utilization of
information so as to produce the best possible informed consent. When we reach
the category of the uncomprehending, two basic questions arise immediately:
(1) When, if ever, should subjects be used for research without their own
consent?; (2) What persons or institutions should be authorized to formulate,
administer, and review rules about the participation of nonconsenting subjects?'
These questions arise because we do need children as subjects, especially for
investigations into the special diseases of children and for general knowledge
regarding the early stages of life and its processes. And there is an acute problem of
lack of a protective structure for children and incompetents aside from consent,
since the further the locus of the decision-making as to consent is from the child
subject, for example, the less certain we can be that the consent decision actually
coincides with the child's value preferences and desires. The more uncomprehending
the subject, the greater the need to place the decision outside that subject and
the more the policies of freedom, autonomy, and dignity that the consent rule is
supposed to promote in the first place are undercut.
In using children as subjects of medical experimentation, is the nature of the
threat of harm greater than in a comparable experiment that employs adults?
One harm that may be difficult to evaluate is that we may either prevent or retard
the child's natural development with a psychological harm that may affect the child
much more than it would an adult, since the child possesses both an unformed
body and mind. Experimenting with a child may deprive him of the chance that
other people have to arrive at the stage of adulthood comparatively unmolested.
The argument against experimentation would be that society sees childhood as
something of a grace period, as a time to shield children from harm so that they will
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be able to develop to a point where they can actually exercise their own freedom
and autonomy. This is the essence of paternalism and probably in fact reflects
a fundamentally shared societal value that may warrant extra protection from
medical experimentation.
Turning to mental incompetents for a moment, there may be reasons for
treating them differently than children (though both groups are uncomprehending).
Our assumption as to experimenting on children was that it could lead to psychological
harm and retard their development. With mental incompetents not capable of
being educated any further, this assumption could well be irrelevant. We would
conclude that it is probable that less harm is done in experimenting on mental
incompetents. And in a gross sort of utilitarian way, it can be argued that such
incompetents do not and cannot contribute to society.
Yet such arguments may be balanced by emphasizing the symbolic commitment
to the values of fredom, autonomy, and dignity that our society maintains through
the informed consent requirement, whether it is the person himself or his legal
guardian or representative who ultimately decides whether or not to give consent. This
is the recognition of the idea that there is a limit to the extent of man's violability.
In fact, the symbolic commitment argument may carry more weight with children and
mental incompetents, simply because these potential subjects do not possess the
capacity to prevent their own violation at all, and hence cannot even fulfill
the minimal requirements necessary to make consent a viable protection for their
interests.' 3 We may be particularly sensitive to the possible "brutalization of
society" through experimenting with children and incompetents. Also, children are
the "future" and society may be wary of mortgaging that too soon. These factors
do not necessarily militate against such experiments, but they do suggest that our
calculus of decision should recognize these considerations and weigh them as
additional, relevant information.
Fixed Rules and Benefits
If we focus on the specific harm involved in experimentation on these
uncomprehending groups, there seem to be three general approaches: (1) treat
the uncomprehending just like all other experimental subjects; (2) set up special
rules for the children and mental incompetents; and (3) take each case by itself, on
its facts, and take into account as one additional factor the status of youth or
incompetence. There is a tendency to treat the uncomprehending subjects with
spacial rules.'0 4 The rules, however, can seem too rigid in certain circumstances, and
so exceptions tend to be made. But the more cases we decide according to "rules
with exceptions" the closer we seem to get to the case-by-case approach.
Problems arise in attempting to apply set rules to experimentation with
uncomprehending subjects. We recall that the Nuremberg Code stated that people
involved in experiments should possess the legal capacity to consent.'0 5 A strict
reading of that Code would seem to rule out all uncomprehending subjects.
Such a hard line was rejected in the Helsinki Declaration which indicated that minors
could be used if (1) mentally competent adults were unsuitable for the investigation,
and (2) the consent be given in writing by the legally authorized representative
of the subject "under circumstances in which an informed and prudent adult could
reasonably be expected to volunteer himself or his child as a subject.' 0 o6 But Chief
Justice Burger has gone so far as to state that "no adult has the legal power to
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consent to an experiment on an infant unless the treatment is for the benefit of the
infant."' 0 ' This seems to be the prevailing American legal doctrine, and it has
led to some strange formulations of the concept of "benefit."
Traditionally, therapeutic operations on young children have always required
the consent of the parent.'
Minors approaching the age of maturity have been
held to be capable of giving their own consent.'
But emergency situations will
permit a waiver of any consent requirements so that life may be saved, even when the
parents cannot be reached in time.1 '0 Further, where the parent unreasonably
refuses consent a court may, as in other cases where it is necessary to act for the
welfare of the child, remove him from the custody of the parent, and appoint a
custodian, who may then consent to the operation."' While the courts speak in terms
of an implied consent in the latter two situations, we might more properly view it
as permitting the physician to make the reasonable assumption that if the patient
had been competent and had understood the situation, he would have consented, and
so the physician is entitled to proceed."' While these doctrines seem well-settled in
the therapeutic context, they may be open to question the closer we move toward
clinical research.
A most interesting illustration in this regard arose in 1957 when the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts issued three highly significant opinions in
declaratory judgment proceedings in a developing area of medical science: the
homotransplantation (from one human being to another) of functioning tissue
(kidneys)."' The first successful kidney transplants had taken place in identical
adult twins in 1954 in Peter Bent Brigham Hospital in Boston."' By 1956 there
were requests for similar procedures on minor identical twins, where one of the twins
was suffering from chronic renal disease which would soon have been fatal.
The question was whether or not the consent of the parents (actually a request)
was sufficient to warrant the hospital to go ahead. Unsure of its legal position, the
hospital sought legal guidance.
As we have seen, in most cases with minors parental consent on treatment was
controlling, but this applied only when the treatment was to be for the benefit
of the child." 5 Here, parental consent to the operation on the kidney recipient
was proper. However, whether parents could consent for the donor was another
question. Half of the "treatment" appears to be therapeutic and half experimental,
since taking one kidney away from a healthy donor could leave him open to some
potentially serious future risks. In Masden v. Harrison (two nineteen-year-olds)
the judge heard testimony from the consenting parent and the donor twin, who
seemed fully informed and willing to give his consent."' Psychiatric testimony was
also taken, the judge finding that if the operation were not performed and if the
sick twin were to die then this would produce a "grave emotional impact" on the
donor twin."' Thus, the judge found benefits to both twins and allowed the operation.
Psychiatric testimony was produced in the other two Massachusetts cases as well,
with the judge finding the benefits to both donor and donee to be sufficient enough
to warrant the transplant.
As Curran has indicated, ". . . the benefit found by the court with the aid of
psychiatric evidence is more the prevention of possible detriment than it is the
conferring of a positive gain."" 8 The cases raise immediate problems regarding the
"benefits to the donor." Note that we are speaking of operations on a child that
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have no real direct benefit to himself, but may be very beneficial for others, whether
they be his brothers or sisters, parents, friends, etc. In spite of a clear rule allowing
no experimentation on minors unless for their own benefit,"' these three cases
reveal how easy it is for a court to find "benefits" to a donor if it really
wishes to do so.
Thus, the rule against such experimentation does not really protect potential
subjects at all, and it is illusory to think that it can. While torturing themselves
to fit the situation into the rule, courts are really deciding such cases on an individual
basis, after considering all the relevant circumstances. But few other subject
safeguards have yet been developed to make sure that a child donor actually has
any substantive protection beyond that supplied by the deciding judge. It seems to
me quite short-sighted to insist on the benefit rule if it can be so easily met with
all sorts of "trumped-up" benefits. In line with my general thinking, it may be that
we do not want hard and fast rules applicable to experimentation on children.
But we should consider childhood itself as an important factor in making the decision
(perhaps apply the "sliding-scale" as to a child's comprehension), as well as any
unusual benefits or risks to others and to society as well as to the donor child.
Curran and Beecher propose a scheme for child donors in experimental cases
such as the kidney transplants.' 2 0 For organ donations, they suggest that the donor
be fourteen years of age or older, intelligent, and mature enough to give informed
consent, and that his parents also give consent. Also, they indicate that donations
could be restricted to relatives or close friends.'2 The suggestions on lowering
the donor age and emphasizing his comprehension may be good ones. But trappings
of the old inadequate protections exist in setting a definite age limit and restricting
the donee class.1 ' For nontherapeutic experiments, they require that children
under fourteen years may participate where there are no direct benefits to themselves,
where the studies are sound, promise important new knowledge for society, and there
is no discernible risk. If the child is over fourteen, his informed consent would
be sufficient, and parents would only be required to consent in cases where there
are discernible risks. Insofar as this approach looks to the quality of the experimental
design, the gains to be achieved, and risks to the donor it begins to focus on the
real protective devices for donors. Otherwise, the formulations of Curran and
Beecher reflect many of the traditional misconceptions as to the utility of consent
as well as the difficulty of abandoning it for more substantive subject protections.
Recent Cases
Two other transplantation cases deserve mention before closing. In very few
states is there clear precedent which would indicate that a parent or guardian has the
power to consent for a child to a surgical procedure which is for the therapeutic
benefit of someone other than the child himself. In the two leading recent cases
dealing with this problem,' 3 courts have found that they have equity power
to authorize parents or guardians to consent to the procedure. Strunk v. Strunk
involved two brothers, Tommy, aged twenty-eight with chronic kidney disease, and
Jerry, an incompetent of twenty-seven years of age whose mental age was estimated
to be about six years. The desired operation was a kidney transplant from the
2 4 Jerry's mother filed an equity petition
younger incompetent to his older brother.'
seeking authority to give consent to the surgical procedure for him. The Kentucky
court relied on the "doctrine of substituted judgment" to establish its equity power to
authorize the parent's consent:
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The right to act for the incompetent in all cases has become recognized
in this country as the doctrine of substituted judgment and is broad enough
not only to cover property but also to cover all matters touching on the
well-being of the ward.' 2
The holding here was therefore based on a finding, after taking psychiatric
testimony, that there would be an extremely traumatic effect on the incompetent if
his only brother died.1 " The "benefit" to Jerry from the transplant was protecting
him from the materialization of the trauma.'
Again we see a court that hung its
holding on the "benefit" rule but actually decided the case-fortunately-on a
comprehensive look at all the facts of the case. It is illusory to believe that a benefit
rule can actually produce the best result in every concrete case.' 28
Hart v. Brown dealt with two seven-year-old twin girls, one suffering from
kidney disease, the other perfectly healthy.'
The parents brought an action for a
declaratory judgment as to the authority to consent to a kidney transplant from
the healthy twin to the ill one. The court here, too, relied on the doctrine of
"substituted judgment" to approve the operation, but qualified its opinion by
requiring a "close, independent and objective investigation of their [the parents']
motivation and reasoning."1 30 Further, the court held that the need for the operation
would have to be urgent, the probabilities of success most favorable, and the duty
clear.' 3 ' Again, there was reliance on psychiatric testimony showing that the donor
twin would have a better family life if her sister were enabled to live.
We see a favorable development in this case of a court of equity taking account
of the facts of this particular case to do both justice and common sense. In objecting
to an overly structured, formalized definition of consent applicable in different
ways to different groups of subjects for medical experimentation, I have been
arguing for a broad-based utilitarianism that will consider all the circumstances of
a case to be relevant to the consent decision so as to maximize the protection of
subjects through a well-considered application of common sense in a particular
context. It seems to me that consent, while perhaps a relevant factor in determining
whether to go ahead with an experiment, may not always be dispositive. It may be,
if our primary concern is to promote human dignity instead of health, and if it is
possible for a consent requirement truly to reflect our society's esteem for the status
of being human. The fundamental issue, however, must be that
. .,..the manner in which experimentation is conducted may affect the
trust among members of the community that society will protect the dignity
of an individual irrespective of that individual's ability to assert and
enforce a claim to such protection.'
It might, therefore, not be wise to dispense completely with the consent
requirement in medical experimentation, for abandoning it may weaken the mutual
trust which holds the members of a community together, because they could no
longer he sure that they will be protected when they are unable to protect
themselves.'3 3 If such protection is a major goal, then public awareness of the
substantive weaknesses of the doctrine of informed consent should prompt us alllawyers and doctors particularly-to begin the diligent search for effective
alternative safeguards.
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CONCLUSION

While this paper is by no means exhaustive, I do believe it reveals that we
have been laboring under some serious delusions concerning the doctrine of informed
consent. In short, we have tried to make the doctrine bear a load that it is simply
incapable of handling. We assume that informed consent is the central protective
device for subjects in medical experimentation, yet we find that there are such
great barriers to both the function of informing and consenting that true informed
consent perhaps cannot be achieved. And we never even stop to examine whether the
subject has comprehended the data on which he is to base his decision. We have
made consent an absolute value when we should be devising mechanisms to mediate
between legitimate, conflicting ethical claims and values. And we have left the
toughest ethical choices to the investigators, rather than making them the basis for
serious public discussion, reflection, and clarification.
The end result is that patients/subjects are often lost in the shuffle. Aside from
consent we have developed little in the way of substantive protections for subjects.
Consent cannot guarantee either a good or an ethical experimental design, nor
can it foster an equitable selection mechanism to obtain the subjects needed for
important medical and scientific research. It is time that we stop deluding ourselves
that we have found one answer to controlling the development of certain biomedical
technologies, because such delusions invite complacency and a self-satisfied posture
that can only be an invitation to disaster in the long run. Our need, then, is to
continually question and challenge our operative assumptions, to seek new and better
ways to cope with old problems. This is a matter of will, of the human spirit.
It is not the technology that directly threatens man so much as it is his irrationalities,
his vanities, and his pride.
One could conclude on a pessimistic note by suggesting that attempts to
institutionalize the making of judgments between the individual and society in the
context of medical experimentation are doomed to failure, due to the nature of
severely conflicting values and goals of all the participants in the experimentation
process: the investigators, subjects, the State, and certainly the professions.
As professionals it is our duty to approach these conflicts in a rational manner.
We can start by rethinking the informed consent doctrine in terms of its purposes
and what it can realistically help us to achieve. These may only be the symbolic
values that I have spoken of in this paper. If so, then we must search elsewhere to
develop a rational control mechanism for medical experimentation that adequately
balances, preserves, and promotes the plurality of interests and values that is
the very strength of our culture.
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